TOP SECRET
Co
No.
AL SECRETARIAT FILE
(174) in TS X 5/62
No.
PERSONAL
Seen,
thank yu
GOVERNMENT HOUSE,
HONG KONG.
573
2 February 1965
Dear Higham
Thank you for your letter of 15 February which arrived just before the C. D. S. I will comment on your letter first before going on to our discussions with C. D. S.
2.
Your paras. 1-3 The debate has done a certain amount of harm to confidence, in again raising doubts in people's minds (unfortunately often those most naturally anxious to preserve the British connection) as to Britain's real desire to help and support Hong Kong; but for the moment the overt reaction has died down.
3.
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Your para. 4 It is in fact already recognized by the C. B. F. in making his dispositions that an IS situation could be dealt with only by weakening 48 Bde. to the point where it could do little to prevent incursions over the frontier. The present garrison - at 5.7/3 major units permanently stationed here is already well below the eight the Army Council recommended and Minister accepted early in 1961. Since then our population has increased by another 600,000, from 3. 13 M. to 3. 74 M. The recent reductions in the garrison have not, I think, been based on a re- assessment of the need but rather dictated by financial and manpower stringencies.
4.
Your para. 5 The probable saving from withdrawing the Hunters alone frankly seems very small compared with the risks of so doing. In addition to the points you mention I might add that their withdrawal (which would be very obvious as R. A. F. Kai Tak is alongside the civil airport in a very crowded area) would demonstrate to all (including the Americans) our inability to challenge intrusion and cast doubts on our intention to defend ourselves. A point which has never been mentioned so far as I know is the possible reaction of international air operators if they had to fly civil airliners into Kai Tak absolutely without any cover. I do not know what they would think, but I fancy they would not welcome it; and, as I understand the matter, the popularity of Kai Tak is a valuable bargaining counter in obtaining landing rights for BOAC elsewhere. This aspect is, however, certainly better
assessed in London.
5.
Your para. 6 The trouble with the principle you quote is that (being contained in a TOP SECRET document) it is not known outside a very limited circle; and, while it may be accepted in London, it certainly isn't here or ever would be (any more than it was elsewhere in 1776!).
J. D. Higham, Esq., C. M. G.,
Colonial Office,
London, S. W. 1.
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Zhacha & DEF 75/54/02
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6.
The revised estimate of our expenditure on defence and security in 1964/65 incidentally is (in round figures) £12 M. or $192 M. This is about 13% of the year's expenditure, which is not an inconsiderable proportion. It cannot sensibly be compared, of course, with the U. K. proportionate figures, as seems to be the recent tendency in some quarters; since, first, much depends on what is included as defence expenditure (e. g. whether defence research and development is included) and, second, the U. K. 's commitments include its commitments to foreign and commonwealth countries.
7.
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Your para. 7 Apart from being most unlikely that the Chinese would refuse us water we would of course be dependent on Chinese water only in a drought even graver than in 1963 i.e. a completely unprecedented drought. Moreover, Plover Cove in about 1968 will treble our present storage capacity.
8.
Although we get a lot of food from China (e. g. most of our meat) we are not dependent on Chinese supplies. In the past they have cut off supplies of some commodities and, after initial difficulties, we have found alternative sources. Of course if all our outside communications were cut too, then we would be in difficulty; but a mere absence of supplies from China could be weathered for quite some time, and would involve China in a quite serious loss of foreign exchange.
9.
y
Your para. 8 (and your telegram 319) · As I have indicated in my telegram I fear we have no one here whose Arabic is other than very rusty, or indeed any other suitable Senior Superin- tendent who could be spared.
10.
To turn now to our discussions with C. D. S.; he made no reference to water or food supplies or to the Aden post, but spoke generally about the pressure that was likely again to develop to reduce the garrison. He urged us strongly to prepare quickly a comprehensive paper which would go much further than arguing the case for a garrison of this or that size, but would attempt to set the case for maintaining the present British position in Hong Kong in a far wider context, political
A as well as military. We also rather briefly discussed the Hunters. copy of his note on the discussions is attached. I was not consulted on the wording and only saw the note just before Lord Mountbatten's departure. Nevertheless, it is a generally acceptable record apart from the insertion underlined, which I was able to discuss with Zuckerman and ask him to have inserted.
11.
We can prepare a paper on the lines C. D. S. suggested, although we are perhaps not the best people to set the arguments in a wider context. Because of C. D. S's insistence that the matter was urgent we will, indeed, start to think about such a paper; but the fact remains you have not actually asked us for anything of the kind and I do not know whether you would in fact welcome it. Could you therefore let me know fairly urgently :-
(a) /
Behachet | A DEF 173/411.
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age 9
age 9
Page
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& DEF 74/51102
крараз
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3
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(a)`
(b)
(c)
whether it would help if we attempted a paper
of the sort suggested and sent it to you informally; and if so
how soon would you like it?
Can you give us any idea of precisely what it is we should primarily endeavour to counter with our arguments, i. e. is it a complete withdrawal of the garrison that is seriously threatened, or a substantial reduction to perhaps one or two major units, or is it primarily arguments against increasing the defence contribution that are required?
but any
I realize that this last question may be difficult to answer; guidance on this point or any other advice on the form of the paper would be much appreciated.
Yous ever theuch
*
P. S. Since I drafted the above C. B. F. has suggested that, as this
proposal came from C. D. S. , you might like to consult the
Ministry of Defence about it. C. B. F. himself is writing to the Ministry about his part in the exercise.
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