TNAG-0481-FCO40-546-Strength-of-garrison-in-Hong-Kong-Lord-Mountbatten-s-visit-t-1974 — Page 7

THIS IS A COPY

THE ORIGINAL, HAS BEEN RETAINED IN THE DEPARTMENT’UNDER SECTION

3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958

The Commander British Forces Hong Kong recalled that in

the 1956 riots five battalions were deployed in North

Kowloon alone. He explained that/this outline plan for the deployment of his existing Garrision envisaged the use of the

two British battalions on IS tsk first, with two

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Gurkha battalions in reserve for IS. He considered British

Troops to be more suitable in the Hong Kong IS role than

the Gurkhas. He envisaged one Gurkha battalion with all the available supporting arms deployed on the frontier task with the aim of identifying, reporting and delaying any

Chinese advance. He estimated that it would take the

Chinese between 24 and 72 hours to reach Hong Kong.

General O'Connor also mentioned the Chinese 47th Army, com-

prising 4 divisions and with an amphibious capability to lift 30,000 men, as an AW threat to the Colony.

I concluded my discussions with the Governor by emphasising the Government's determination to maintain a military presence East of Suez. I described the Far East as being crucial, Singapore vital and Hong Kong highly desirable; I did not envisage any policy of dis- engagement in the Far East, nor did I consider that the position of Hong Kong could be judged in isolation.

Sir Solly Zuckerman supported my views and suggested that any reduction in our forces in any one part of the theatre could entail dramatic changes throughout the

Far East.

I considered it prudent to advise the Governor that, in view of the Government's considerable anxiety about

defence expenditure, he should assume that the Hong Kong: Garrison was especially vulnerable and prepare his case accordingly on the lines or our discussion.

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