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D
be easier if we agreed to consult soon, and it may be that the Hong Kong arguments for delay are no longer valid.
6.
The best way to set this out is in a Personal letter from You may wish to consider whether
Sir D Watson. I submit a draft.
this should be shown to the PUS.
5 December 1974
ACS
A C Stuart
Hong Kong & Indian Ocean Dept.
сс
Mr Jackson
Mr Thomson
Mr Wilford
1. I agree with the draft, subject to one amendment pencilled in at paragraph 11. I believe it to be true that the Governor's position is that while he would not wish to negotiate until his budget is out of the way he would reckon it necessary and useful to consult EXCO informally much sooner than that.
2. I very much agree with the thought in paragraph 6 that all possible alternatives for the level of a military presence in Hong Kong have not been radically considered. For example, given the size of the territory, could not the essentials be preserved if we had a naval presence with fast patrol boats (smuggling and illegal immigrants); some helicopters (observation and a visible presence); perhaps a couple of highly mobile battalions for internal security duties; together with reinforcement of the police. I would not suggest putting any such
guess at a force level in writing to the Governor, still less within Whitehall. But were Hong Kong to make such a bid it would smoke out MOD, causing them to focus on re-deployment/redundancy of excess units.
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/3.
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