TNAG-0479-FCO40-544-Strength-of-garrison-in-Hong-Kong-1974 — Page 45

necessary to replace the regular forces with reservist formations; for example, if two of the six brigades of our Army in Germany could be reduced to cadre strength, to be made up in time of

tension from reservists, savings of about £30M a year would

theoretically be possible, some of which would be in foreign

exchange. However, apart from the penalties mentioned, reservist

units, in the absence of a trained pool of conscripts, cannot be

immediately effective in a mobile mechanised war. I might say

that it is also very doubtful whether sufficient volunteers could

be recruited into the Reserve Army, given the long training

commitment that would be necessary. In any event, our Army in

Germany is already heavily dependent on reinforcement in time

of tension to bring it to a war footing in fact by 10,000

regulars and 57,000 reservists.

financial advantage and considerable military and operational

disadvantage in this option.

We therefore saw no significant

11. Having examined all the alternatives, we concluded that most,

if implemented, would lead to a major breach of NATO strategy.

The only area which offered scope for significant savings was

that of specialist reinforcement: I will discuss this shortly

12.

Let me now describe the broad capabilities we propose

to retain or to change, in each of the areas of strategic

priority.

- 5-

SECRET UK EYES A

Page 45Page 46