necessary to replace the regular forces with reservist formations; for example, if two of the six brigades of our Army in Germany could be reduced to cadre strength, to be made up in time of
tension from reservists, savings of about £30M a year would
theoretically be possible, some of which would be in foreign
exchange. However, apart from the penalties mentioned, reservist
units, in the absence of a trained pool of conscripts, cannot be
immediately effective in a mobile mechanised war. I might say
that it is also very doubtful whether sufficient volunteers could
be recruited into the Reserve Army, given the long training
commitment that would be necessary. In any event, our Army in
Germany is already heavily dependent on reinforcement in time
of tension to bring it to a war footing in fact by 10,000
regulars and 57,000 reservists.
financial advantage and considerable military and operational
disadvantage in this option.
We therefore saw no significant
11. Having examined all the alternatives, we concluded that most,
if implemented, would lead to a major breach of NATO strategy.
The only area which offered scope for significant savings was
that of specialist reinforcement: I will discuss this shortly
12.
Let me now describe the broad capabilities we propose
to retain or to change, in each of the areas of strategic
priority.
- 5-
SECRET UK EYES A
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