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- intelligence casizlerations aprit aport
Llike
obviduly
Oman, we should like to withdraw from Lesirah, Pay we should huwer foste
valie Would to discuss with you the ful of the
intelligence
)
defate facilities there before taking any final
decisions. On Cyprus, we shall wish to talk about
the short and long term positions. In the chor be
term we shall wish to work out on a cost benefit
basis which of the various elements in the present
intelligence facilities should be retained during
the interim period in which we hold both SBAS but
maintain a greatly reduced military presence in them. These are matters best pursued separately, but
I think it right to mention them now. We attach
considerable importance to the maintenance of the
close and valuable Anglo/American intelligence
relationship. We have had this relationship very rich
in mind in our thinking. In the light of it ve
le
should like detailed discussions with you about
handling of those cases where our reading of allied
and British defence interests suggests that we might
make savings but where such savings could camue
ifficulties for the intelligence community.
Conclusion
25. In this preliminary tour d'hori-on, I love
picked out only the most important central bands
in the politico-economic thinking which has lain
has behind our Defence Review, and been crystellised in
pen
the proposals which Field Marshall Carver will now
explain to you. We can return to particular points
later. I should like for the moment to add only that
we would welcome your views on all points. The
Cabinet in London have agreed to the Chiefs of t: f'e
outlined proposals for the future size and shape of
/British
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