5) Dd145178 400m 5/73 G.W.BILul. Gr.353
NOTHING TO SE WÄTTEN IN THIS MARGIN
continued denial it seems clear that it need not
involve British military presence on the Island.
bintoff was of course warned when he signed the
agrement that a (rogressive run down would any
start well before our final vithdrawal.
inve
to
ト
22.
Cyrus is a more complex probler. Given our
for NATO wish to concentrate our effort in the critical arers }
there would be a strong case on defence grounds for
our withdrawing the British forces now on the 1s]: n.
It may be that the surrender of sovereignty over
our two bene aras in the Island could
i
Calalyht
Jes a 172
role in the working out of the long term political But we must tread wanly selle ent which we are now seeking. For the rompb
L
>
we shall for primarily political reasons, hold on
boph
to fire base areas and retain reduced forcen in
Squadrons
force L
them. (The permanent air force in Akrotiri vill be
withdrawn and will therefore no longer be decl to CENTO.)
continuelle
for no prescit 23. Finally in Omon we shall continue upport,
the Sultan in the lofar War, but shall reduce and
ozanbadly withdraw our direct assistance as roon
as the progress of the war, and the omanisation of
the Bultan's forces permit. We should of comge
continue to provide loan-service personnel as
lon as they are required.
Intelligence
24. There is one separate problem on which I should
perhaps touch. Our thinking abou' long long, Cern
end Cyprus may be of some particular interest in
Washington in viewof the intelligence which we
obtained in all three places and pool with yours.
There should be no difficulty about Hong Kong. 48 for
/Cran
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.