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advance far enough during September for Ministers to be able to say much more publicly or to the National Executive Committee than they have already said.
3. However, we need not be entirely negative about Kr Healey's suggestion. Action on Hong Kong is already under way.
We are
in touch with the Governor about future possible force levels in the light of the OPD discussion on 1 August and we expect to have his views by the end of this week. In the light of these consulta- tions, Ministers could in the near future decide what our detailed objectives should be as regards the future size of the forces and of the Hong Kong Government's financial contribution. These decisions could be revealed to other Ministers in confidence, but any premature lcaks (eg through the National Executive Committee or other consulta- tive bodies) would substantially prejudice the Governor's task in getting the maximum long Kong financial contribution, (Assuming we intend to keep force levels of a reasonable size, we would not necessarily need to consult the Americans). But it is questionable whether we should then start formal negotiations at once, in advance of consultations elsewhere on other areas of the Review. As they would involve discussion by the Governor with his unofficial advisers, the fact that they were in train would be likely to become public knowledge; so possibly would their content. Difficulties could also arise from starting the negotiations if other connected issues eg communications (Gan, Masirah) the future of the Gurkhas, Brunei, were still undecided. Negotiations with Hong Kong are likely to be among the most difficult of our "consultations" and they are more likely to be productive if they are kept in step with the others.
4.
There are three other fields in which we could also consider action before long:-
(i) Cyprus The keeping open of the option to go ahead with a
rundown in Cyprus as part of the Defence Review was fully covered in the briefs for Geneva II, and will remain our objective. It seems likely that we shall soon have to discuss with the Americans, and possibly thereafter with other interested parties, what our future lans for the SBAS and the intelligence effort on the island should be. Preliminary FCO views on the subject have already been submitted to the Secretary of State in preparation for further consideration by the Defence Review Steering Committee and thereafter by Ministers, probably in the second half of September if not earlier. The Americaus would not be surprised and could certainly not object
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