TNAG-0477-FCO40-542-Strength-of-garrison-in-Hong-Kong-1974 — Page 139

SECRET

1

sustain anything like current force levels in Northern Ireland. The maritime reductions would amount to about one quarter of the total ready allied naval and air units in the Eastern Atlantic and Charmel Command area, This could lead to major delays in trans- atlantio reinforcement and resupply and to the inability to conduct sustained operations in the early stages of tension or war. The cuts in our air forces would also significantly diminish our commitment of strike and reconnaissance airoraft to SACEUR, and our contribution to such international obligations as those in support of Berlin. Our amphibious and reinforcement contribution to NATO would have to be abandoned,

45. We believe that measures of the severity implied by the First Level would be regarded by NATO as a major change in our defence polioy, making it virtually impossible for NATO to maintain a credible

虐

strategy with very serious implications for the cohesion of the

Alliance.

If provision had to be made for some non-NATO and Mediterranean commitments from within the First Level, the reductions in our NATO contribution and the effects on NATO would be still more drastic.

4.6. We have considered whether in these circumstances, instead of making a general reduction in all three main parts of our NATO contribution (to the Central Region, to the naritime area and to United Kingdom defence) it would be preferable to maintain a

: contribution in one area, eg the Central Region at about the Critical Level while making disproportionately large reductions in the other two.

This would however result in very extensive reduotions in the non-favoured areas. The outs involved either in the across the board approach or in a selective approach would have most serious military

and political consequences for NATO and for our own security.

47. We have examined more broadly the effect of applying the lower levels or defence expenditure. The implications of achieving

4 per cent GNP by 1983/4 (the Third Level), which would require a saving of a further £400 beyond the First Level, would clearly be still more serious. Additional problems would arise from the more

rapid rundow implied by the Second Level (44 per oent GNP by 1978/9)

and these would be still further accentuated in the case of the Fourth Level (4 per cent GNP by 1978/9).

24.

SECRET