TNAG-0477-FCO40-542-Strength-of-garrison-in-Hong-Kong-1974 — Page 138

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43. The main measures resulting from the application of the First Level, assuming the total abandonment of all commitments outside the NATO area and in the Mediterranean, would be -

ሴ. The Royal Navy would have to abandon the amphibious shipping entirely and to reduce the Royal Marines by a total of 30 per cent. By comparison with the Critical Level further reductions in naval forces involving 5 fewer destroyers/frigates, 3 fewer MCNVs and 2 fewer afloat support ships. There would be a total reduction of £M700 on planned new construction during the review period. Services man- power would be reduced by a further 9,500 (to a total of 18,500) and all Naval and Royal Marine Reserves would be

disbanded.

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In the case of the Army, either BAOR would be reduced to 40,000 men, with the United Kingdom Land Forces (including 10,000 war reinforceme ts for BAOR) remaining at 75,000 (as at the Critical Level) or BAOR would be reduced to 50,000 men (as at the Critical Level) and the United Kingdom Land Forces to 62,000. (The difference between the BAOR and United Kingdom Land Force options is accounted for by the hither manpower and equipment costs in BAOR).

0. For the RAF, reductions would involve 28 fewer frontline aircraft in the strike/attack/reconnaissance role than at the Critical Level; 19 fewer strategic transport aircraft;

32 fewer helicopters; 13 fewer search and rescue aircraft and 3,000 fewer uniformed men,

440 The reduction of BAOR to 40,000 men would involve a major short- ening in the frontage which could be held by 1(BR) Corps, leaving a gap which neither the United States nor our European allies could be expected to fill. The political and military consequences would be very serious indeed. TA BAOR were maintained at 50,000 men and the establishment of United Kingdom Land Forces reduced to 13,000 fewer than at the Critical Level, this would put at risk our ability to bring BAOR up to war strength and would make any other reinforcement of ACE, including our contribution to the ACE Mobile Force, impracticable. 'At this level of forces it would be impossible to

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