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diminish. In the event of civil war the commitment would be very
large and could only be sustained for a very short time from existing
force levels. The Northern Ireland commitment is therefore a specific constraint on any major reduction in manpower strengths. If the
commitment were to diminish in size, the size of the Armed forces
could not as a result be reduced, because there would be no guarantee
against a resurgence of violence. If on the other hand the commitment
were to disappear for ever (eg if Northern Ireland ceased to be part of the UK), the area in which home defence tasks could arise, and
hence overall home defence provision, would be reduced. The extent
of the reduction would depend on the circumstances; and there seems no point in examining a number of detailed options in anticipation of hypothetical answers to the prior political questi on. 76. The main implication for the Army of the Northern Ireland
commitment is one of serious overstretch, to such an extent that
operations at their present intensity cannot be sustained from within
the current size of the Army without serious detriment to the well-
being of the Service. This is exemplified by the number of times
units have to return to the Province. Already six units have carried
out five tours in Northern Ireland; and a further sixteen have done
four tours. This places a particularly severe strain on the infantry. In addition to the 4 resident infantry battalions, 33 battalions, taking roulement into account, are required to maintain a further 11
on task. The number of infantry battalions currently in the UK and
BAOR, bearing in mind the ineligibility of some units such as the Gurkha battalion and the Irish battalions, is inadequate to meet
this requirement.
It is only by misemploying other teeth arm units
in the infantry role that the necessary force levels can be met. Overstretch results in inadequate time for training units in their
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