TNAG-0476-FCO40-541-Strength-of-garrison-in-Hong-Kong-1974 — Page 43

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is also a growing feeling in the Alliance generally that in view of the common problems nearly all members face, a common response, built in large part on the Eurogroup, will have a better chance in the

future under the impetus of necessity.

67.

It would in any event make little sense to consider substantial changes in the operational roles or capabilities of British forces for NATO without first examining nationally and in the Alliance the scope for possible intra-Alliance spe cialisation. The object of balanced NATO forces should take precedence over attempts to maintain balanced national forces. The possibility of replacing separate but

similar national capabilities by cooperative arrangements is already under discussion in the Alliance, but only in certain specialised fields, eg communications, army bridging and obstacle crossing equipment, airfield point defence and the Channel mine sweeping and

mine hunting. A British initiative to widen the scope of such

discussion would be welcomed by many allies, including the Americans, provided that our aim was seen to be to avoid damage to our front

line strength. Some of the specialisation might be on a regional basis. For example, we might initiate discussion of a major rationalisation of support roles for land forces in the Central region, for example whether there is any more that the Germans can

Several European do to provide support there for their allies. countries are feeling the pinch, and are beginning to recognise that

each small nation cannot expect to be able to contribute to every role

required by NATO Strategy. It would be in the British political and

strategic interest, as well as that of the Alliance, to seek an increase of cost effectiveness along these lines and also in various

back-up functions, eg logistics, training, medical services etc. Similarly, consideration of rationalisation of air defence functions

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