TNAG-0476-FCO40-541-Strength-of-garrison-in-Hong-Kong-1974 — Page 42

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onality in weapons systems and logistics.

For example in some

There

cases neighbouring units cannot exchange rifle ammunition.

are many difficulties in rectifying this situation. The principal one

is that a significant advance in the process requires one member of the Alliance to develop a much increased capability, before it is

militarily possible for other members to reduce or abandon their own efforts in the same field and to divert resources to other capabilities as a quid pro quo. Thus a nation which wishes to take a significant

lead in rationalisation and specialisation should, from a military

point of view, be prepared to increase defence expenditure in the

short term.

66.

However, from a political point of view, if the defence budgets

of several allies are simultaneously being reduced, there is a strong prima facie case for promoting such measures of rationalisation and

specialisation as may be practicable and can be agreed upon. And in

the longer term a major effort could result in better use being made

by the Alliance as a whole of the limited resources available for

defence. It will help our position both immediately and in the future, though Ministers' decisions cannot be conditional upon it, if we take

a lead in getting our allies to press ahead vigorously with rational-

isation and specialisation in the expectation that over time this will

produce a more efficient and cohesive defence structure at a lower cost,

albeit with the consequence that nations assuming responsibilities on behalf of other allies will be entering into binding contractual

commitments which they will be unable to break unilaterally without

grave repercussions. Such an effort requires a high level political will and determination, (to surmount much inevitable upheaval and

inconvenience; and often, in the shorter term, increased cost and

reduced efficiency). The Americans and the Germans have both

recently told us that they believe the attempt should be made. There

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