TNAG-0476-FCO40-541-Strength-of-garrison-in-Hong-Kong-1974 — Page 222

Mr Youde

FAR EAST DEFENCE

1

SECRET

Midgriks

misinatio

R.E. 18/4.

TWITMENTS

R.E.

2

9/4.

+KK 10/9

I have no comments on Mr Hickman's draft submission atbronco to his minute of 19 March. But we are in rather an odd position about the Hong Kong garrison.

2.

There was no suggestion cither in the Chancellor's minute to the Defence Secretary or in Mr Mason's reply, of any intention to review the need for and size of the Hong Kong garrison.

fresumably this was because the Chancellor was pinning his request for an immediste decision on Five Power to the 1968 policy, which specifically excluded cuts in Hong Kong. It may be that the Defence Review, to which Fr Mason refers, will repair this omission.

But 1.

3.

We have agreed that we should not feed in, as an FCO thought, the possibility that Hong Kong could do with a smaller garrison. still believe it to be the case, and given the cost of the ilong Kong garrison, it makes somewhat absurd our search for candle-end savings on foreign expenditure. I realise that the liong Kong garrison is not paid for out of FCO votes; but, from the point of view of HMG as a whole, there should at some point be a link between the consideration of separate departmental priorities. I have discussed the question of possible cuts in strict confidence with Mr Stratton, recently roliticel Adviser Hong Kong. He expressed concern about any general policy of withdrawal and about the dangers of affecting confidence in iong Kong. However he thought it not impossible that a battalion, or even two, might be slipped out of Hong Kong without too much notice being taken, provided that the headquarters structure of CBF stayed the same and thet a Lieutenant General remained in command. He thought that a four battalion force might be needed to contain civil disturbances in long Kong, but conceded that this might be an exaggeration.

I have no recommendation to make. But we should perhaps consider at some stage, whether there is anything we should do to point up the unreality of looking for small savings which could cause trouble (which night presumably even include Five Power), when the possibility of more substantial savings lics to hand. Even the welfare argument for ateyin: in llong Kong that it is needed to give the Army some overseas experience - falls away if we can grasp the nettle of abolishing the Gurkhas, since the British contingent in Hong Kong would presumably remain the same size even if the garrison was reduced to a force sufficient to meet a purely internal threat.

DESLA

A C Stuart

Hong Kong & Indian Occan Dupt.

20 March 1974

сс

Mr Wilford

Mr Hickman Mr Squire Mr Evans ✓

To Exaus,

I am inclined to

with The Stuart. I have

agree

always thought that the arguments for retaining a

SECRET

Hong King were largely speciones.

fairly substantial force in Hong Kong