SECRET
SECRET
Far East but on the facts that: a) the Gulf is a critical area
and Masirah is strategically placed in a crisis it could have
value both to the Americans and to ourselves; b) it costs
comparatively little and if we are to remain in Oman for a
period we would inevitably have to perform our side of the
Masirah bargain; and c) it offers intelligence and re-broadcasting
facilities which would be expensive to replace.
The Gulf
(ix)
Naval exercises, visits and the loan of British Service
personnel would continue insofar as resources remained available
but the British Military Assistance Team in Sharjah would be
withdrawn.
CENTO
(x) Because of its importance to Iran we would maintain our
CENTO commitment but we would withdraw our declaration of forces
to CENTO except to the extent that any forces maintained elsewhere
for other reasons, eg in Cyprus or Malta could be declared to
CENTO in addition.
Cyprus
(xi) For some time to come we would maintain a presence in
Cyprus. In the light of the attitudes of the Warsaw Pact,
relations in Cyprus and with Greece and Turkey and developments
in the Middle East and elsewhere we would review the situation
regularly with the object of reducing associated expenditure to
the minimum feasible level. We would negotiate a reduction of
our contributions to UNFICYP with the aim of rapidly reducing
our contingent to a token force. We would maintain both the
SBAs and our other facilities in Cyprus, but reduce the garrisons
as much as possible. We would rapidly run down the functional
aspects of Cyprus as a staging or reinforcement post.
J5
SECRESECRET
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