TNAG-0476-FCO40-541-Strength-of-garrison-in-Hong-Kong-1974 — Page 102

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Kenyan and Mauritius commitments would be left quietly in being,

but no forces would be explicitly provided to meet them. The

naval presence east of the Cape of Good Hope could continue on

the group operating system but perhaps more intermittently than

at present. We would continue to co-ordinate naval movements

with the US and Australia.

Occasions for the use of Simonstown

would be reduced. The Beira Patrol would not be given up, should

the Portuguese attitude make it still necessary, but the require-

ments for fulfilling it would be further relaxed.

SEATO

(vi) All SEATO military plans are in abeyance; one further

naval exercise is planned for later this year. We would decline

to make further force declarations to SEATO and to participate

in SEATO exercises except occasionally when we happen to have

forces, eg naval groups, operating in the area in any case. A

commitment to consult remains a Treaty obligation。

South Korea

(vii) We would withdraw our token force.

Oman

(viii) We would reduce our involvement in Oman to the maximum

extent which the progress of the war in Dhofar allows and in

a way acceptable to the Iranians, Americans and Saudi Arabians

while making it clear that our continuing minimal involvement

is connected with our modern relations with the States in the

area and our mutual interest in oil and oil revenues. We would

retain Masirah but reduce the forces stationed there and make

it clear at an appropriate later stage that at the end of 5 years

we would expect to have no forces in Oman except those required

by the Masirah Agreement. The argument for retaining Masirah

rests, not on the old case of the reinforcement route to the

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