TNAG-0436-FCO40-501-Relations-between-Hong-Kong-and-international-organisations-1973 — Page 91

6. The Committee is, of course, primarily interested in

Southern Africa, it will welcome a more forthcoming attitude by us in discussion of the future of the smaller UK Dependent territories, and it may be able to accommodate our wishes in a number of cases. But if we rejoin, it may be harder for us to maintain a distinction between the problems of the smaller territories and the more intractable southern African problems. We shall have to speak and vote not only on Rhodesia but on Namibia, the Portuguese territories etc. This will adversely affect wider UK interests (see para 8 below); it will also complicate our efforts to get the Committee to focus on the separate problems of the smaller UK Dependent territories.

7.

As regards southern African questions, our underlying relations with the Committee will undoubtedly improve whether or not we rejoin, provided that we are willing to take part and submit evidence on Rhodesia etc, to the Committee and thus recognise its UN role. But there is no guarantee that if we move towards the Committee, the Committee will move towards us when it comes to the drafting of resolutions. It is possible that full UK membership might even encourage the Committee to adopt more extreme ones. It is unlikely that the Committee will deliberately soften a Rhodesian resolution to meet our difficulties. even if we had, for instance, adopted a tougher line on sanctions. The trouble is that the Committee has to act with one eye on internal developments in Rhodesia, in particular the ANC's success or lack of it; and until it is obvious that the liberation movements are militarily and politically on top, the Committee may well feel that it has to go on passing tougher paper resolutions in order to encourage them and to keep up a general feeling of momentum.

8. There is a wider aspect; our role as representatives of western countries, as opposed to spokesmen for the UK alone. On questions not affecting British dependent territories, e.q. Puerto Rico, we would probably find ourselves in a minority. On Namibia/Southern Africa, we would probably find ourselves among the more moderate members of the Committee unless we had made drastic policy changes, e.g. entered into the Council for Namibia. The question then is whether we should bear the brunt of defending western interests trade investment or otherwise in Southern Africa. There is a case for arguing that those countries whose policy roughly tallies with ours should not be allowed to shelter behind us, which they would be able to do if we were on the Committee. (It is true that the Danes would join in urging moderation, and that they are widely respected;

t

J

but then their material interests in Southern Africa are not great, whereas ours are).

In short, while there are certain advantages in full membership, there are also a number of disadvantages which argue against any immediate decision on our part to rejoin.

•