TNAG-0436-FCO40-501-Relations-between-Hong-Kong-and-international-organisations-1973 — Page 90

COMMITTEE OF 24: UK OPTIONS

ANNEX

(a) Full membership:

the pros and cons

1. In theory, we could not rejoin before 1975 because the Committee is already full. But we can assume that an existing member would be willing, or could be persuaded, to stand down for us if necessary.

2.

The advantages of rejoining the Committee are essentially twofold. First, it would be seen and appreciated by some as a broad political gesture, and as evidence of the new Government's determination to take account of Afro-Asian opinion in the UN and to improve the UK's relations with the Afro-Asian world generally. In this way rejoining might yield us side benefits in other areas of UN work outside decolonization.

3.

Secondly, if we rejoined we would have the right to speak on every item under consideration by the Committee and its two sub-committees; to lobby on the relevant draft Committee resolutions from inside, and to vote on them (though the Committee generally operates by consensus). We might be able to damp down some resolutions, particularly those on the smaller dependent territories. This in turn would have its uses since the subsequent Fourth Committee and General Assembly discussions are largely based on the Committee's work and recommendations. More generally we might be able to bring greater influence to apply on the Afro-Asian moderates, such as Trinidad, Fiji and the Ivory Coast.

4.

There are, however, disadvantages in rejoining. They vary according to what the UK's policy is on African and colonial issues. If, for instance, there were no substantial change in our policy on Rhodesia, Namibia, visiting missions etc, there would be no point in rejoining; we should continue to be attacked and our presence would simply encourage further more pointed criticism. We could not expect the Australians, and other "moderates" to help us.

5.

The picture improves if we are able to make policy changes where the smaller dependent territories are concerned, i.e. acceptance of visiting missions and tacitly at least, of the Committee's right, in consultation with us as administering power, to make recommendations where necessary, for the future of these territories. This assumes that we can persuade those of our territories which are internally self-governing to accept missions. It will be necessary to discuss this problem in advance with Mr Salim. There are grounds for hoping that most of the Committee can be persuaded not to take too doctrinaire an approach.

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