TNAG-0423-FCO40-469-Construction-of-an-underground-railway-system-in-Hong-Kong-1973 — Page 112

Sii Dykatson M. Wilford

For

Consideration.

Mr Wiford

Sir D Watson P.S. M. Rogle

CONFIDENTIAL

Minister

o Crosso Goodfell

I tonik we should

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Personnel

HONG KONG MASS TRANSIT SYSTEM

119

Flag A

1.

You asked about Tokyo telegram EXCED 28.

(123

Flag B

(124)

Flag C

2. ECGD have undoubtedly got themselves too deeply involved

with the Japanese, and have left our embassy in Tokyo under

the same misapprehension. (See Burges Watson's letter to Mason

of 24 May, especially paragraph 6.)

3.

I spoke to Mr Glaves-Smith on my return. He said he was

equally perturbed and had asked ECGD to send off a dementi.

Mr Fell's telegram to Tokyo is attached.

4.

I agreed with Mr Glaves-Smith that even this was barely

enough. If the Japanese told the Hong Kong Government that we

had been talking seriously about sharing the contract with them

(as they might if they felt they were likely to be excluded)

then the almost certain result, given what we know of the

Governor's attitude, would be to make Hong Kong go for a multi-

contract solution.

5.

Mr Glaves-Smith therefore arranged for me to be invited

to a meeting between himself, Mr Fell and Lord Limerick on

1 June, to put these points again. I did so. Mr Fell said his

intention had been merely to keep the door open for sharing the

contract, if at the end of the day we found we wanted to. It

was, however, agreed that he would speak negatively to Mr Ozu

in Vienna, and that DTI would put our embassy in Tokyo straight.

There was some discussion about whether we should assure the

/Hong Kong

CONFIDENTIAL