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if we chose to do so. Second the consortium approach might
be established, but with no group clearly ahead, or with one
of the others favoured. That would be a good moment to think
about sharing, and we could indeed put some pressure on the
Hong Kong Government to help bring this about. Third none of
the consortia might satisfy the Hong Kong Government's demands
and the balance might swing even further in favour of multi-
contracts. If that happened we would need to tackle the
Governor at Ministerial level, and could put it to him that,
if it would make the consortium approach more attractive to
Hong Kong, we could consider a link with one of the other
consortia, thus perhaps ensuring for Hong Kong the advantages
of both bids and some of the benefits of competition.
8.
In the last case we would have to act fast, but if we got
an unfavourable report from the consortium representatives by,
say, 21 March, there would be time for a Ministerial message
from us which could be followed up by Mr Walker in person when
he stays with the Governor on 31 March. Mr Fell and Mr Glaves-
Smith agreed with this analysis and are submitting to their
Ministers accordingly. Mr Fell asked that we should keep the
knowledge of the Japanese approach to as restricted a circle
as possible.
9.
Meanwhile the DTI are doing what they can to ensure that
the consortium understand the questions that have to be covered
at the 19 March meeting. But the consortium remain very doubtful
whether it will be possible to quote any meaningful price at all
/at this
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