TNAG-0417-FCO40-463-Review-of-narcotics-problem-in-Hong-Kong-1973 — Page 166

CONFIDENTIAL

South East Asia. They pointed out that now that they had withdrawn from Vietnam they had less concern in this area and it was more in the interest of the United Kingdom and Hong Kong rather than of the United States that such a group should be formed. They recognised however that the potential danger to themselves still existed and they wanted to retain their involvement with our assistance and

companionship".

27. The Hong Kong officials welcomed the suggestion. They saw no practical or political difficulties and were quite agrecable to meeting on the proposed basis, Hong Kong was now looking outwards; they recognised that they had not adopted the right posture in the past. They had completed the planning stage of their new activities and were now looking for action. The United States proposal fitted into the development of their plan.

28. On behalf of the United Kingdom I said that we had found participation in the present meeting very useful, and although I could not commit the United Kingdom Government to cooperating in the proposed Working Group we would certainly give the proposal favourable consideration with some urgency. I judged that as a result of our general reaction to Rolph's reports, I could indicate that our reaction might not be unfavourable. I did however sound some notes of warning. I stressed that we should not do anything at this stage which appeared to conflict with any initiatives likely to emerge from the work of the Ad Hoc Committee. Any activity on the basis of Anglo/American/Hong Kong cooperation would have at present to be in a low key and clearly to avoid overlapping the United Nations work. We should not appear to be putting pressure on Far Eastern countries by this tri-lateral activity. I also said that the model that Ingersoll had used to illustrate his proposal (namely the Franco/Canadian/US Working Group) was not altogether applicable to the South East Asia situation, since the United Kingdom was not involved in the same way as the other states.

29. The Americans emphasised their view that it was essential to have United Kingdom participation. They pointed out that the United Kingdom was responsible for Hong Kong foreign relations and therefore action could be taken only through United Kingdom Embassies in South East Asia both in respect of general influence and in respect of such matters as, for example, the issuing of visas. It was in the United Kingdom's own domestic interest to become involved, considering the possible threat of Hong Kong heroin on the United Kingdom scene. Lastly they thought that our position on the Ad Hoc Committee would make us valuable members of this group.

30. It was left that we should consider the proposal in London on the basis of a brief report which Rolph will provide. (There was a suggestion that perhaps the Canadians and Australia might in due course be invited to join, but I poured cold water on this in view of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee.) I think that what might emerge from this, if it is accepted in principle, is a two tiered operation of the Forking Group, with (a) a management group, on which the United Kingdom could be represented, to formulate general policy, to lay down guide lines for cooperation, and to define and formalise existing arrangements, and (b) an opera- tional group (comprising Hong Kong and regional BNDD) in which the United Kingdom need not be involved except, perhaps, on an ad hoc basis (if, for example, heroin export to Western Europe was being considered)

•

CONFIDENTIAL