RECOMMENDATIONS
(1) The Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control, in its present form, should be abolished.
(a) In its place, an International Narcotics Control Board should be established which would be headed by a White House based official appointed by the President.
(b) The head of the Board, which would be a full-time job, should be authorized to preside over the formulation of poli- cies and programs relating to international narcotics control. (2) The Office of National Narcotics Intelligence should be transferred to BNDD and integrated with that Bureau's Office of Strategic Intelligence.
(3) Only personnel who speak the language of the country in which they operate should be assigned to intelligence collection duties abroad.
(4) Congress should authorize and appropriate international narcotics control assistance funds on a line item basis to insure that funding requests do not become excessive.
(5) Steps should be taken to preclude interagency competition for international narcotics control assistance funds. These funds should be expended on programs which will have the greatest im- pact whether such program originates in the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs or AID.
(6) Congress should require periodic reports from the execu- tive branch showing the amount of assistance furnished to each country, including the type, quality, and value of equipment fur- nished. This report should also contain data giving amounts spent by all agencies of the Federal Government on international nar- cotics control programs, including personnel salaries, allowances, and U.S. overhead costs.
(7) The United States should enforce the provisions of section 595 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and insure that all countries receiving U.S. military assistance provide the same degree of security protection afforded such articles by the United States.
(8) The United States should continue to apply diplomatic and economic pressures at the highest levels of government in South- east Asia to insure that there is no weakening of the narcotics sup- pression efforts which have been started, particularly in Laos, Thailand, and South Vietnam.
(a) Where conclusive evidence shows high ranking or in- fluential figures to be involved in narcotics, the U.S. Govern- ment should strongly urge those governments to prosecute
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