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Hong Kong
8.
My visit here was primarily to see the forces, and I found them in good heart. Hong Kong, under the leadership of the new Governor, has a booming economy, and relations with China over the border are much more relaxed than in recent years.
Indonesia
9.
My arrival coincided with a visit by Vice President Agnew, and I was consequently unable to see President Suharto. Despite the Vice President's professions of continuing U.S. support, the Indonesians (and others in South East Asia) suspect that the U.S. commitment to the area will be increasingly eroded by pressures at home and the further evolution of Sino/U.S. relations. Although I had talks with the Defence Minister, General Panggabean, and the Foreign Minister, Mr. Malik, my visit was mainly a military occasion. Panggabean and his fellow Generals seem to be pretty firmly in the saddle and, although I was personally unimpressed by their philosophy of 'national resilience', I judge that they are making good progress in recovering from their recent troubles.
Japan
I tried to
10. On my way back I called at Tokyo, where I had short meetings with Mr. Tanaka (to whom I delivered your message about your talks with President Nixon), Mr. Ohira, the Foreign Minister and Mr. Masuhara, Director General of the Defence Agency. discover how Japanese defence policy is likely to develop in the post-Vietnam scene against the background of the emergence of China (and Mr. Tanaka's visit to Peking). I found there was a general acceptance in Government and also in academic circles that the present policy of self defence, to which Japan is limited by the constitution, is not only right but the only practicable course. Militarism has cost Japan dear in the past and has little appeal. Because there appears to be no significant threat, the Opposition believe that even the present minimal forces, costing less than 1% of G.N.P. are unnecessary or so small as to be useless.
The Government have no intention, however, of departing from the concept of self-defence forces, recognising that to defend their trade routes they must continue to rely upon the U.S. security pact; but I feel that they may find it difficult to build up their air defence and ASW forces, as the U.S. would like them to do, and I found no desire on their part to go nuclear.
11. I took the opportunity to mention our hope that the Japanese would not make any precipitate decision on Concorde, but would take advantage of the extension of their options, to consider the matter carefully. This was noted without commitment.
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/U.S.A. and Kenya
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