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2. (contd)
where, even if the Hong Kong Government corresponds direct with relevant U N Secretariat, we are basically represented through the U K delegation. Having made the point in the Committee of Twentyfour that Hong Kong is a part of China, the Chinese delegate could scarcely leave without comment her separate representation in ECAFE. The fact that for 20 years and more Hong Kong had co-existed with Taiwan in
ECAFE would be neither here nor there.
3.
We would hope that a Chinese delegate would, as in the Committee of Twentyfour, confine himself to making a statement for the record about the status of Hong Kong, from which we could quietly dissent. Clearing our lines in advance with the Chinese might help to keep any exchange in low key. But it is doubtful whether this would change the Chinese attitude, and it might merely persuade the C P G of our sensitivity. A public agreement to differ is the best we can hope for. At the same time however, given China's wish generally to leave matters over Hong Kong as they are for the moment, we might well get away with no
worse than this.
4.
If China, against our hope, were to pursue the issue, and object fundamentally to Hong Kong's representation in ECAFE, we can certainly fall back on the position that
only ECOSOC has the power to alter the present position (your letter to Chris Howells of 18 February, 1972). But this might only be putting off the evil day, and would in itself escalate the problem. There is also the theoretical fallback position of subsuming Hong Kong's representation within that of the UK. This would broadly equate our position in ECAFE with that in other U N bodies. But after 20 years of Associate Membership this would be a humiliating retreat for Hong Kong even if it was a solution negotiable in the face of the Chinese objection. This apart, we are
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