TNAG-0304-FCO40-340-Effects-of-tariffs-on-imports-of-cotton-textiles-to-UK-from--1971 — Page 142

their case;

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4.

(iii)

(iv)

these talks would be followed by further talks with the

objective of

short and long term amelioration of the British policy.

Mr. Royle suggested that Mr Haddon-Cave let us have early on

the morning of 7 December the form of a statement which Mr Haddon-

Cave would like to make on his return to Hong Kong. Mr Royle was

prepared to speak to the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry

to get DTI clearance on this draft statement as well as to try to

arrange for the announcement of the British Government's decision

before Mr Haddon-Cave returned to Hong Kong.

5. In reply to a question by Mr Royle, Mr Haddon-Cave confirmed that the change in British policy would not lead to either massive

closures of textile firms in Hong Kong or greater unemployment

there. For Hong Kong, the British textile market represented

something like 22% of Hong Kong's output. But the British

Government decision followed soon after the American agreements on

non-cotton textiles and was thus a double blow.

6.

Mr Royle said that he had told Ambassador Kennedy on

3 December about our displeasure at the way in which the Americans had treated the Hong Kong Delegation during the negotiations in

Washington. The American behaviour had been deplorable and

Ambassador Kennedy had been very apologetic about it.

7. Mr Royle said that one of our problems in deciding what weight to give to Hong Kong's position when considering matters

like textiles was that there had been a tendency in the past for the Colony to give the appearance of "crying wolf" and in fact be resilient, and hard-working, enough to overcome the particular problem. It did none of us any good to preach disaster when it

was not likely to occur.

18.

2

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