their case;
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4.
(iii)
(iv)
these talks would be followed by further talks with the
objective of
short and long term amelioration of the British policy.
Mr. Royle suggested that Mr Haddon-Cave let us have early on
the morning of 7 December the form of a statement which Mr Haddon-
Cave would like to make on his return to Hong Kong. Mr Royle was
prepared to speak to the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry
to get DTI clearance on this draft statement as well as to try to
arrange for the announcement of the British Government's decision
before Mr Haddon-Cave returned to Hong Kong.
5. In reply to a question by Mr Royle, Mr Haddon-Cave confirmed that the change in British policy would not lead to either massive
closures of textile firms in Hong Kong or greater unemployment
there. For Hong Kong, the British textile market represented
something like 22% of Hong Kong's output. But the British
Government decision followed soon after the American agreements on
non-cotton textiles and was thus a double blow.
6.
Mr Royle said that he had told Ambassador Kennedy on
3 December about our displeasure at the way in which the Americans had treated the Hong Kong Delegation during the negotiations in
Washington. The American behaviour had been deplorable and
Ambassador Kennedy had been very apologetic about it.
7. Mr Royle said that one of our problems in deciding what weight to give to Hong Kong's position when considering matters
like textiles was that there had been a tendency in the past for the Colony to give the appearance of "crying wolf" and in fact be resilient, and hard-working, enough to overcome the particular problem. It did none of us any good to preach disaster when it
was not likely to occur.
18.
2
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