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CONFIDENTÄL
3.
Neither the Secretary of State nor Mr Aichi will
Subject to your
wish to get involved in the details.
views, however, we propose to recommend that the
Secretary of State should remind Mr Aichi of the importance
$
we attach to this issue and our dismay at the latest indications (Tokyo telegram No 421 of 1 June) that, not- withstanding the Prime Minister's message to Mr Sato, the Japanese appear to be going back on Mr Sato's (admittedly guarded) statement in the Diet that Hong Kong was "not unsuitable" for inclusion in the Japanese scheme, not to
speak of the repeated oral assurances e.g. Mr Hirahara's
to Mr Bottomley we have had from MYFA officials.
4. It is not clear whether discussion of this question at official level will precede or follow the Ministerial talks, but we would wish in either case to make the same basic point, but with more supporting detail, in discussion with Mr Hirahara. The Japanese reply is very likely to be, in effect, "don't worry; we expect to be able to give Hong Kong a better deal in early 1972 than we could (given our domestic problems) in August 1971". If so, we should
have to explain to Mr Hirahara just why it is that we consider such an offer meaningless.
5. I attach for your approval a copy of the two briefs on the above lines which we have drafted in conjunction with DTI, and which have been seen and agreed by Hong Kong Department and Far Eastern Department.
3 June 1971
In Britten
R G Britten
Trade Policy Department
F
cc: Mr Morgan
Mr Laird
FED) HKD)
CONFIDENTIAL
/P.T.O.
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