TNAG-0260-FCO40-296-Legislation-for-prevention-of-bribery-in-Hong-Kong-1970 — Page 227

CONFIDENTIAL

4.

(4)

This spread of corruption will frustrate the purposes of legislation to which we attach

importance (e.g. on labour matters) and may

endanger the morale of the Police.

On striking this balance my personal view was that the

risks which would follow from rejecting the Governor's recommenda- tions were more serious than those which would follow from accepting

them, though of course the final assessment is essentially one

for Ministers who would have to face criticism from one side or

the other according as they decided. But in forming this view

I have to some extent been influenced by the fact that action under 2 of the objectionable clauses (clause 10 and clause 14)

involves the Attorney General and since he has been trained in

the traditions of British law this seems to me to offer some

safeguard against unreasonable uses of the powers in question.

5.

Before putting up the papers to Ministers in this sense

however I ought to invite you and the legal advisers to say whether you feel that I have overweighted or underplayed the

balance of risk one way or the other.

6.

Two incidental points:

(a)

Paragraph 9 of the submission refers to differences

of opinion in respect of five clauses, viz.,

10, 14, 15, 20 and 25. There is however no

reference to clause 20 in either the submission

or the draft despatch and though clause 25 is

examined in the submission there appears to be

no argument against it in the despatch.

CONFIDENTIAL

/(b)...