CONFIDENTIAL
4.
(4)
This spread of corruption will frustrate the purposes of legislation to which we attach
importance (e.g. on labour matters) and may
endanger the morale of the Police.
On striking this balance my personal view was that the
risks which would follow from rejecting the Governor's recommenda- tions were more serious than those which would follow from accepting
them, though of course the final assessment is essentially one
for Ministers who would have to face criticism from one side or
the other according as they decided. But in forming this view
I have to some extent been influenced by the fact that action under 2 of the objectionable clauses (clause 10 and clause 14)
involves the Attorney General and since he has been trained in
the traditions of British law this seems to me to offer some
safeguard against unreasonable uses of the powers in question.
5.
Before putting up the papers to Ministers in this sense
however I ought to invite you and the legal advisers to say whether you feel that I have overweighted or underplayed the
balance of risk one way or the other.
6.
Two incidental points:
(a)
Paragraph 9 of the submission refers to differences
of opinion in respect of five clauses, viz.,
10, 14, 15, 20 and 25. There is however no
reference to clause 20 in either the submission
or the draft despatch and though clause 25 is
examined in the submission there appears to be
no argument against it in the despatch.
CONFIDENTIAL
/(b)...