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10. A recent study has shown (6) that post 1971 it will not be possible to make a contribution of two ships to the ANZUK naval force from the currently planned East of Suez numbers whilst the requirement for one ship on Boira continues and the present rules for the Hong Kong Guardship remain. Since it is believed that two ships are likely to be the minimum acceptable contribution to the ANZUK Force, it is necessary to examine the rules governing the Guardship commitment in order to establish whether any relaxation is possible and if this would provide sufficient ship availability for tasks other than Hong Kong.
Four Days Notice
11. It has already been shown that the type of incidents which would require a frigate to handle would normally bc preceded by a period of warning which could be measured in weeks This suggests that the operational task in Hong Kong could be met by.a frigate at 4 days notice, to reinforce the Colony during periods of tension; which would permit it to be based in Singapore and thereby available for allocation to other tasks for most of the time. Reinforcing in this way would demonstrate our will to defend the Colony against external aggression. However a frigate at this degree of notice would not provide a visible presence in Hong Kong and this would not.... go unnoticed by either the Chinese or local population. Governor and CBFHK attach a great deal of importance to the continuous presence of a Guardship and consider it to be essential to the maintenance of confidence there (5). Since a continuous presence could not be achieved by a frigate at four days notice we do not believe it is an acceptable option unless its absence can be covered by other visiting ships which is discussed below.
Two Days Notice
The
12. The recent study (6) on the Concept of ANZUK Naval Operations assumed that the Guardship commitment should be met by a running ship. An arrangement by which the Guardship could go to two days notice from time to time in order to AMP should Satisfty the Governor's requirement for a continuous visible presence and might provide a gain in ship availability for tasks other than Hong Kong.
13.
Various options for providing AMP for the Guardship have been examined (7), including deploying mobile maintenance assistance from Singapore and UK, and it has been concluded that the best solution would be to provide AMP from within the resident capacity of the Hong Kong Base Maintenance Party.
(5) HQBFHK Signal DO 12 of 14/10/70
(6) D.N. Plans 32/1 of 14th October 1970 (7) D.N.A.P's paper
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