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5. The present notice for the guardship is eight hours, racing to four hours during sensitive periods (i.e. DOUBLE TEMTH etc). On occasions it has been allowed to go to 47% hours notice in order to AMP. CASSUTED MAINTENANCE.
b.e. ship gode alongside
Shore Support
meuntunanu.
مل
PERIOD
field
elo geð
བ ི་ ་
6.
H.M.G. also decided (2) in 1968 to make a small increase in facilities ashore, and to provide the small tanker to guard against the loss of commercial shore fuel facilities through strike action or subversion. The planned build-up of maintenance facilities remains unchanged (4), as a result of H.M.G's current policy for S.E. Asia, and will provide a capacity for up to seven frigate AMPs per year (21 weeks), so long as they are spread more or less evenly, whilst continuing to provide for the MCMV's.
Costs
7. The Hong Kong Government is unlikely to be asked to reimburse Defence Votes for the costs of the frigates because they are regarded as part of our external defence responsibility: The question of costs is therefore not relevant to this examination and is not considered further.
The U.N. Commitment
8. This commitment involves declaring the Hong Kong Guardship and any other H.M. Ships deployed north of Hong Kong to UNNAVFOR Korea. It developed from the declaration of Commonwealth ships to the U.N. Command Korea which existed throughout the Korean War.
No written agreement exists and the ships declared are not at any notice. The commitment is currently under review by political departments and our view is that it could be relaxed to allow for it to be met by ships in Singapore.
The Need for a Guardship::
9. The present assessment of the threat indicates that very. few incidents will occur in Hong Kong waters, without warning which cannot be dealt with by MCMV's and police craft. This suggests that the immediate operational task in Hong Kong could be covered by the MCMV's and police craft. On the other hand frigates have a better performance than MCMV's in terms of speed, size and armament and possess a greater potential for. dealing with Chinese naval interference and piracy; account must be taken in this context of the increased Chinese naval presence in the South China Sea. In addition the presence of a frigate is a visible deterrent to Chinese neval interference and inspires confidence in the Hong Kong population. Since the Governor and CBFHK continue to place much importancy, on the visible presence of a frigate (5) and we understand that the FCC supports this view, we believe that there is a requirement for a frigate presence in Hong Kong.
OPD(68) 32
(2) SP 8876 also PAO 59/70310770
(5) HOBIHK Signal DO 12 of
CÁC PHẦN NỘI ĐI D
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