TNAG-0252-FCO40-288-Strength-of-Hong-Kong-garrison-1970 — Page 41

FCO40 Hong Kong Department Records 聯邦事務部香港部檔案 All

SECRET UK EYES ONLY

ANNEX A to DP 29/70

(Revised Final) (Continued)

BRUNEI BATTALION

27.

If HMG decides to retain a battalion in Brunei after May 1971, its command should be divorced from any arrangements made for the battalion in Singapore. This leaves as the alternatives either command from MOD or command from Hong Kong. Because, inter alia, Hong Kong is nearer and the battalion in Brunci will usually exchange on relief with one from Hong Kong, the second alternative is the better. We consider that command of the Brunoi Garrison should change on 1 April 1971 if, by that date, HMG has decided to retain a battalion in Brunei after May 1971.

SUMMARY

KOLONIA EM CAM.CZ

It

28.

We have considered a five power structure and have shown that it would introduce new difficulties for Malaysia and Singapore, would probably be unacceptable to the other countries and would, complicate the problem of the commitment of forces to SEATO plans. We believe that an integrated ANZUK command system is the most satisfactory structure from the military point of view and would be the most efficient and economical solution. would be supplemented by appropriate liaison committees working with the Malaysian and Singaporean military command structures. Only if such a system proves to be unacceptable for political reasons would we wish to fall back on separate ANZ and UK command

systems.

29.

We conclude that:

CONCLUSIONS

a.

We do not favour a five power command system.

b. The most satisfactory command system would be an integrated ANZUK structure with commanders and staffs provided on a mutually agreed basis.

A

10

SECRET UK EYES ONLY

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