11.
contribution in general.
It would be necessary to argue
as well that this cannot be regarded as on all fours with
the supply of vessels, equipment, etc. to purely local
forces.
(b) Running Costs:
(c)
apart from general argument about the political effects of pinning the entire responsibility on Hong Kong, we could deploy the argument that, in addition to the political need to demonstrate our capacity to provide air cover, there is a need (which seems to us to be as much a military as political point) to provide a
deterrent to Chinese incursions into Hong Kong air space.
This will, in the absence of any air cover in the Colony, undoubtedly involve regular visits of aircraft from the UK. Such visits could be substantially reduced (possibly eliminated) if there was a fighter unit in the Colony. Some recognition of this potential saving to defence votes should be shown in the extent to which Hong Kong is required to meet the running costs.
No costs can be met by Hong Kong prior to 1971:
the arguments to be used are set out in paragraphs 3(c)
and 4(D) above.
A brief could be prepared on these lines for discussion with the Governor, Alternatively this minute (together with copies of the relevant correspondence) might serve the purpose.
20 May, 1969
W.S.
(W. S. Carter)
Hong Kong Department
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.