TNAG-0172-FCO40-208-United-Kingdom-Productivity-and-Efficiency-Study-effect-on-H-1969 — Page 130

CONFIDERIAL

could not therefore impose a tariff on them unilaterally.

The negotiations for a waiver of duty f'rce rights would bo

extremely difficult. Even those countries with no

significant direct trade interest might well try to extract

a high práco for giving up the principle of free entry. We might therefore be faced with the following choices:-

(a) having to pay a high price in terms of compensating

trade benefits or loss of our own preferences;

(b) denouncing the trade agreemento;

(c) dropping the proposal to introduco a tariff. (૭)

The difficulties and dangore in each of these cources a30

obvious.

410

MALA GUERLƏ

43. The President's paper recognises the damago which a

change to a bari22 would cause to the Indian industry.

The President therefore envisages the grant of additional ·

aid to India to offcct at least part of the loco,

difficult to chere Mr. Crosland's belief that agrooment to

compsagation in this epocial case need not constitute a

precedent, Other countries affected by the change (0.8 o

Halta) might voll seek compensation in the form of aid.

Wo night also have similar requests for aid 17, in futuO,

cum commodity policy seemed 14kcly adverpoly to affect

a developing country.

رد ناشطة

146

Paragraph 16 of the paper explains that, during the

CODEDESTAL