TNAG-0147-FCO40-183-Exports-of-textiles-to-United-States-of-America-1969 — Page 148

Reference..

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Even if the Japanese

form we coned Get-

remam

a quich American reaction": after the Japanese P.M's unt to Washington.

YES - Ar Hermann strongly stressed the need for some

Concrete proposal (and the selective approach could no longer be classed in this

Category)

4.

*

(1)

1

some suggestions for a revision of the Terms of Reference which he envisages.

For the next week or two the American pressure will obviously be concentrated on the Japanese covering the period of the Japanese Prime Minister's visit to the US.

In the light of all these considerations we now have to give further thought to tactics and timing though the indications are that, provided the Japanese continue to remain firm, matters are not likely to move very quickly from the American side. We cannot, however, be certain of this and

we should therefore be ready to move at short notice as Washington suggests."

5.

6.

The points for consideration are

}

(i) Should we pursue the idea of a message

1.

from the Prime Minister to the President?

(ii) If so, what should it say?

X

(iii) When would be the right time to send it?

In principle, a message from the Prime Minister to the President may be useful. But it will be our last shot and we must do our best to ensure that it has the maximum effect. Some preliminary soundings (possibly of the Secretary of State, Mr. Rogers, by Mr. Freeman) might well be desirable. We know that our "Mildenhall" initiative produced considerable irritation amongst American officials. This is perhaps a natural reaction to an apparent attempt to go behind their backs and its importance in the context of a direct message to the President should not be over-estimated. Nevertheless, we know that the State Department is, to some extent, "on our side" at present and it would be a pity to risk alienating Mr. Rogers and his officials if this can be prevented by some preliminary softening up.

As regards the content of the message, it will I think be important that, in addition to pointing to the dangers of the course which Mr. Stans has pursued, we should suggest some initiative. On the basis of the considerations set out above, this should I think be confined to repeating our endorse- ment of the suggestion for a study of the problem in GATT. Before this is done, it might be desirable to sound out Mr. Long, the Director General of GATT. whose initial reactions I gather to the idea of a study were not entirely favourable because of doubts whether there was in fact a real economic problem to be studied. Thereafter, if his reaction was favourable, further soundings in Geneva could continue.

8. As regards timing I would have thought that the crunch is not likely to come until after the Japanese Prime Minister's visit to the US. If he shows a willingness to make undue concessions over textiles at those meetings, I doubt whether this is likely to go beyond the general expression of a willingness to be co-operative with the Americans. Meetings with Prime Ministers are not usually concerned with detailed technicalities such as comprehensive

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