AV
97.
[:(f).
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(g)
If all the American cases were bad, the conceding of restraints to them would set a very dangerous precedent both as regards America and in respect of other importing countries.
If both comprehensive and selective bilateral arrangements are excluded, this leaves two alternatives.
(1) To leave the Americans to find their own way out of difficulties into which they have got themselves or
(2)
(2) To have in reserve some
other initiative designed
to help them to save their face.
Washington has pointed o
(in telegram 2757) to the dangers of the Americans going beyond the point of no return over some form of unilateral action. This suggests 'that some means of preventing this should be prepared for use at the appropriate time.
(h). At the Geneva meetings (paragraph 4
of Geneva telegram 543) the EEC threw out the idea of a possible 'GATT study and Sir E. Melville endorsed this. There was no
(1)
detailed discussion of the form such a study might take.
In the discussions in Whitehall,
the Board of Trade have put forward
the idea of a Working Party under
GATT auspices. It has been suggested that this Working Party could serve two main purposes:-
17
A
(i) It could help to prevent unilateral action by the Americans.
(ii)
We could endeavour to ensure that the Working
Party directed itself towards producing a set of criteria which made it more difficult for importing countries to impose restrictions.
(1) The danger of this form of
(K).
Working Party approach is that we could well finish up with a situation where it was made easier for importing countries to impose restraints.
If, therefore, some initiative for a study under GATT auspices is to be pursued and at the moment it seems the only viable suggestion - there would be advantage in restricting the study to a fact finding exercise. Mr. Dunnett has produced a paper on this subject and I am sending him
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.