TNAG-0135-FCO40-171-Tariff-preferences-for-developing-countries-1969 — Page 212

COMMERCIAL

DEPARTME

AUC 3-1969

CONFIDENTIAL

ECO 6/8 83 96/0

Illustrative U.S. Submission to the DECD Concerning Generalized Tariff Beferences for Developing Countries

ENGO

OECD member countries will recall that at the Trade Committee meeting of June 12-13 the United States representative indicated that the United States preferences submission might take the form of several illustrative approaches to a temporary, generalized preference system.

J

This type of submission seemed best designed to assist the process of study and analysis in which the OECD countries are involved.

7/8

Upon further reflection, however, the U.S. Government has decided it is unnecessary to duplicate the approaches already on the table in Paris for analysis--the open- ended preference approach of the type submitted by the United Kingdom, and the tariff quota approach of the type submitted by the European Communities. The United States stands ready to examine both of these.

An additional approach which deserves attention equal to that given these two, in our judgment, is the competi- tive need approach. Since this has not yet been brought. forward for consideration, it is outlined below.

This U.S. submission is, of course, illustrative and for discussion purposes only. It does not commit the United States to participation in a scheme of generalized preferences or to any particular approach. Should there be a concrete proposal by the United States it would be drawn up in the light of further internal policy review, consultations with the U.S. Congress and farm, industry, and labor groups, as well as discussions in the OECD and UNCTAD concerning the various inter-related elements of a system of generalized preferences.

Qualifications of General Applicability

The following additional qualifications, assumptions and conditions would apply in connection with any approach to a preference scheme in which the U.S. might participate:

1. There would be adequate burden sharing among donor countries.

2.

Any preference granted would be of temporary dura- tion, would not constitute a binding commitment, and would not in any way impede future tariff reductions on a most- favored-nation basis.