TNAG-0124-FCO40-160-Future-of-Hong-Kong-1969 — Page 70

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73.

(e)

We would not hamper Chinese attempts to win over the

population by peaceful persuasion provided they are kopt within such bounds as would enable us to overlook

them.

(f) We would welcome confidential advance information on

when they themselves think a take-over would be

appropriate and the method by which it might be effected;

we would try to fall in with them on the clear under- standing that we could not accept (i) humiliation, (ii) disorder, or (iii) denial of opportunity to protect those to whom we had a duty.

(g)

(h)

Both sides would have to accept that overt attitudes towards each other might have to be apparently somewhat hard and would recognise that this was contrived. The one thing we would not accept is a situation in which the Hong Kong Government would become a Chinese puppet under duress.

This course would have many dangers. It might merely

encourage the Chinese to pursue, without deviation, their aim to

reduce Hong Kong to subservience. It would have to be pursued

with the utmost secrecy and care over a long period; the risks of a leak about our intentions would be grave (paragraph 62 above) and before embarking on such a course some military contingency

planning would be necessary. We could not be sure that the link in the channel of communication in these difficult and tricky circumstances would adequately serve its purpose. But it does minimise some of the dangers of a formal approach (as noted in paragraph 66 above) and particularly it provides us with the means of drawing back if we should be rebuffed. It enables the Chinese

to talk to us about Hong Kong without loss of face and, if they

respond reasonably, we should be able to avoid a humiliating

withdrawal.

74. The precise manner in which the approach might be made and the

channel to be used would, of course, require the most careful

detailed examination. But if, through a reliable intermediary, we could by these indirect means (as opposed to direct negotiations)

clarify our position to the Chinese, there is some hope that, having considered it carefully, they might come up with a sensible

response in the end and that some entirely cover understanding might be reached.

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/Prospects for

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