550
Sir S. Tomlinson
TOP SECRET
5.2
Flag (41
HONG KONG:
LONG-TERM STUDY
The attached paper on "Hong Kong: long-term study" seems to me to suffer from having been prepared too close to the events of 1967 and in the midst of the Cultural Revolution in China. The result is that in my view it is too pessimistic about the likelihood of it being possible to reach any accommodation with the Chinese Government at some date in the future and equally about the likelihood of China trying and succeeding in overturning established order in Hong Kong by fomenting civil disorders. A picture is drawn of a China so unyielding and negative that the courses open to H.M.G. are all extremely uncomfortable ranging from an undignified scuttle leaving more than three million Chinese to make the best accommodation they can withthe Communists at the moment the Treaty runs out to a voluntary abandonment of the Colony at some earlier date.
2. The problem, as I see it, is to devise, if it is possible, some way by which H.M.G. are relieved of the necessity of handing over millions of unwilling Chinese to a Communist regime. The only hope which I can see is dependent upon there being in power in China a Government, Communist almost certainly, which is more interested in rebuilding their country's economy than in pushing matters too far ideologically. It may be argued that this is very unlikely. I agree that it is not easy to be optimistic about such a develop- ment, but after Mao's death I think that there is at least an outside chance of it happening.
we
say by 1975 a danger of But for building
3. If such a Chinese Government comes to power shall be approaching the period in which there is confidence beginning to evaporate in Hong Kong. up the Chinese economy from such a meagre base as they have the Chinese will certainly need a very long time and will continue to want the $600 million which they at present earn annually from Hong Kong. To guarantee the continuation of their earnings they will have to make known that they are not going to interfere with Hong Kong. They might do so either by letting H.M.G. know that the present position will be allowed to continue post-1997. They might alternatively prefer to seek some concessions from H.M.G. which they would trade for a prolongation of existing leases to a date by which they assess that they will no longer need their foreign exchange earnings from Hong Kong and can afford to resume control of the Colony. This might take us perhaps to 2025.
4. Before considering possible concessions, however, the question must be faced whether H.M.G. would be willing to adopt a policy which resulted in Britain remaining a Colonial power into the 21st century. However unwilling H.M.G. may be to contemplate this I submit that the alternatives, based on an assumption that China will not be cooperative or let us gracefully abandon Hong Kong,
/as
TOP SECRET
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.