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that these were "unequal treaties"
an attitude for which
there could be considerable support from other countries,
(Russia
X particularly those disputing ceded areas with us.
would, however, be reluctant no doubt to accept the
proposition that treaties with China involving the transfer
of territoty are all "unequal"). The ceded areas of Hong
Kong could not be viable separated from the main industrial
areas in the New Territories; the frontier in Kowloon would
be impossible to control; all the sea and air approaches could
be claimed as under de jure Chinese control as well as being
under their de facto control. Continued retention of these
areas would make no sense, either economically or politically.
Timing of an Initiative
80. The timing of any initiative on our part with a view
to withdrawal would clearly need careful judgment. A number
of the factors to be taken into account have already been
mentioned notably, China's interest in reaching a solution
and the possibility of handing Hong Kong over with its trade
outlets to the Western world unimpaired (in itself greatly
dependent on American willingness to co-operate).
present climate is not favourable in any of these important respects. At this point of time We can only indicate the
how
L
The
broad limits of time which, in our opinion, may be available
to us to make such an offer.
81.
Genuine negotiations could not be mounted in present
hot in the foreseeable future conditions in China, and we cannot foresee when these may be
more favourable; nor at the present time with the character-
tould
of the regime in Peking so uncertain) does, it seem possible
to reach any kind of tacit understanding. If we sought now
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