TNAG-0122-FCO40-158-Future-of-Hong-Kong-1968 — Page 46

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(the

whose numbers would mushroom overnight among those

great majority) of the population who would see no

alternative but to remain; they would be joined by criminal

and hooligan elements. The morale of the Police Force

would dip sharply (if it did not disintegrate altogether);

the Force is preponderantly Chinese and its members would

understandably be looking over their shoulders. The task

of maintaining public order might devolve entirely on the

garrison and the likelihood is that it will prove impossible

to maintain control throughout the whole area of the Colony.

This would undoubtedly be the case if the Chinese Government

deliberately set out to foment the situation.

63. These two major problems present us with a conflict in

time scales. We should need as much time as we could get to

discharge our responsibilities to people. But the

difficulties we would face in circumstances of growing

disorder and economic confusion indicate that the period

of withdrawal should be as short as possible.

64. It is most unlikely (with the precedent of Shanghai

before us) that China would stand by while we stripped Hong

Kong of such people and assets as we wished to remove. We

can expect to be restricted both as to the time allowed and

in our freedom of action. Given the attitude of successive

Chinese Governments to our tenure of the Colony and to

foreign Governments in general, they are likely to want to

make our loss and discomfiture as great as possible.

Nor is

it within our power, by military force, to hold them off

while we make the necessary arrangements.

This likely

Chinese attitude and the nature of the problems we shall

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