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qualifications.
Most of the vulnerable category will have
these but there may be some financially expensive resettlement
costs.
61. It is estimated that there are about 35,000 Hong Kong
Chinese in the United Kingdom; we do not know the exact
number or how many of them are U.K. and Colonies citizens.
There could be considerable opposition to taking any more.
Taiwan would no doubt in these circumstances take quite a
large number. America and Canada are countries with large
Chinese communities that might take significant numbers.
Some South American countries (e.g. Brazil) might offer
special facilities. But we cannot talk to any of these
countries (other, possibly, than America, Canada and
Australia) in advance about this problem. The period of
our withdrawal is likely to be measured in months and past
experience (as evidenced by U.N. efforts on behalf of
refugees) has shown that much longer than this will be
necessary to negotiate permanent settlement opportunities.
Temporary transit areas will therefore be necessary and we
may find countries very reluctant to act as host to large
numbers of Chinese who have no guarantee of permanent
residence elsewhere. Singapore, Taiwan, Philippines and
our Pacific dependencies may be possibilities.
62. The second major problem will be the maintenance of
internal security. Public knowledge that we were preparing
to withdraw would have an immediate and profound effect on
the internal security situation. Those fearful of the change
of regime would be clamouring to get out; communists would
get to work on a confused public and rally their sympathisers
/whose
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