TNAG-0122-FCO40-158-Future-of-Hong-Kong-1968 — Page 132

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11

shar.... Only a is I think a little too weak.

I belive wi shund

and force us to withdraw on their terms. The initiative

would seem to be in our hands only to the extent that:-

(a) the economic value of Hong Kong might be so

84.

important to China that they would be prepared

to treat with us to preserve this so far as

possible after our departure;

(b) the settlement of Hong Kong's future could be

linked with a desire by China for a detente

in its international relations.

H. THE WORST CASE

In the event of a Chinese military attack with the

object of taking over Hong Kong, present instructions (as

1967

embodied in the directive to the Commander, British Forces)

are that military action should be "to expose any Chinese

incursion into the Colony with armed force as an act of

aggression". We would not resist to the bitter end, laying

mait first for a brief piñcel other waste to Hong Kong in the process, but would withdraw before

greatly superior forces In short we would surrender Hong

an initial period of destermind ruistance.

kaist determinedly, Kong with only a show of resistance.

but for only a

lunited pusied junt

85.

If as a result of unremitting Chinese pressure on

in case an mindiate Hong Kong (short of a military take-over) we were forced

& determined Minstance Caused a champ

to the point that our position was untenable and that our

of heart- which is administration could not survive without conceding a measure not impossible.

of influence and control to China, our conclusion is that we

would have to take a unilateral decision to withdraw with all

its attendant difficulties. The timing of such a decision.

would be very difficult. If the situation had reached that

point, we would have to accept that the process of withdrawal

would not be easy since it would greatly depend on Chinese

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/goodwill,