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11
shar.... Only a is I think a little too weak.
I belive wi shund
and force us to withdraw on their terms. The initiative
would seem to be in our hands only to the extent that:-
(a) the economic value of Hong Kong might be so
84.
important to China that they would be prepared
to treat with us to preserve this so far as
possible after our departure;
(b) the settlement of Hong Kong's future could be
linked with a desire by China for a detente
in its international relations.
H. THE WORST CASE
In the event of a Chinese military attack with the
object of taking over Hong Kong, present instructions (as
1967
embodied in the directive to the Commander, British Forces)
are that military action should be "to expose any Chinese
incursion into the Colony with armed force as an act of
aggression". We would not resist to the bitter end, laying
mait first for a brief piñcel other waste to Hong Kong in the process, but would withdraw before
greatly superior forces In short we would surrender Hong
an initial period of destermind ruistance.
kaist determinedly, Kong with only a show of resistance.
but for only a
lunited pusied junt
85.
If as a result of unremitting Chinese pressure on
in case an mindiate Hong Kong (short of a military take-over) we were forced
& determined Minstance Caused a champ
to the point that our position was untenable and that our
of heart- which is administration could not survive without conceding a measure not impossible.
of influence and control to China, our conclusion is that we
would have to take a unilateral decision to withdraw with all
its attendant difficulties. The timing of such a decision.
would be very difficult. If the situation had reached that
point, we would have to accept that the process of withdrawal
would not be easy since it would greatly depend on Chinese
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/goodwill,