TNAG-0114-FCO40-150-Detainees-and-prisoners-following-19671968-disturbances-1969 — Page 50

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10.

I have the following comments on these recommendations.

(a) A Formal Statement

I concede that to make a formal statement to the Chinese

to the effect that we have gone as far as we can in

Hong Kong has its attractions. It would be useful if

we could make our firmness of intent over the future

conduct of affairs in Hong Kong absolutely clear to the

Chinese. It is however questionable whether a formal

statement would have this effect and whether it would

succeed in heading off the Chinese from making further

demands. To go out of our way to tell the Chinese that

we are "sticking" might well convey to them the opposite

thought that we were in fact making the first move

towards a negotiation for the release of other detained

British subjects. In any case the Chinese could hardly

let a firm statement on our side pass without reply.

If they believed a negotiation was in the offing they

would pitch their demands high. This is the opposite of

what we wish to achieve. In any case we made a formal

statement to the Chinese Government regarding Sino-British

relations, including Hong Kong, in early 1968. The

statement remains, as the Chinese know, on the table.

I see no advantage and some disadvantage in adding whąt

to them would seem clearly as a form of qualification

requiring analysis and meanwhile possibly leading to

interference with the resolution of the Grey problem.

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