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I have the following comments on these recommendations.
(a) A Formal Statement
I concede that to make a formal statement to the Chinese
to the effect that we have gone as far as we can in
Hong Kong has its attractions. It would be useful if
we could make our firmness of intent over the future
conduct of affairs in Hong Kong absolutely clear to the
Chinese. It is however questionable whether a formal
statement would have this effect and whether it would
succeed in heading off the Chinese from making further
demands. To go out of our way to tell the Chinese that
we are "sticking" might well convey to them the opposite
thought that we were in fact making the first move
towards a negotiation for the release of other detained
British subjects. In any case the Chinese could hardly
let a firm statement on our side pass without reply.
If they believed a negotiation was in the offing they
would pitch their demands high. This is the opposite of
what we wish to achieve. In any case we made a formal
statement to the Chinese Government regarding Sino-British
relations, including Hong Kong, in early 1968. The
statement remains, as the Chinese know, on the table.
I see no advantage and some disadvantage in adding whąt
to them would seem clearly as a form of qualification
requiring analysis and meanwhile possibly leading to
interference with the resolution of the Grey problem.
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