TNAG-0114-FCO40-150-Detainees-and-prisoners-following-19671968-disturbances-1969 — Page 48

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deduction that the local communist cadres in Hong Kong,

whose morale must be important to Peking, will expect

the Chinese Government to use the British subjects as

a means of helping their colleagues in prison. Thus

we must in my view accept that we may well come under

pressure both from relatives in this country (and

possibly their Members of Parliament) and from Chinese

to pay a price for the release of the British subjects.

We should certainly resist auch pressures firmly.

need to avoid setting a precedent for bargaining has

been very much in our minds when we have resisted

Chinese pressures over Mr. Grey. While therefore we

must not minimise the seriousness of the problem which

may face both the Governor and ourselves, I think we can

reassure him about our intentions,

The

Ne now move on from the Governor's anxieties to his

specific recommendations. He anticipates a difficult situ-

The

ation should the Chinese commit themselves to a demand for the

premature release of further confrontation prisoners.

Governor would like to make it clear to them that we are

calling a halt. He suggest the following tactics.

(a) He puts forward only to dismiss it the suggestion that

it might be worth making a formal statement of firmness

to the Chinese in London or Peking.

(b) He recommends that we moderate our references to

"improving Sino-British relations".

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