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8.
deduction that the local communist cadres in Hong Kong,
whose morale must be important to Peking, will expect
the Chinese Government to use the British subjects as
a means of helping their colleagues in prison. Thus
we must in my view accept that we may well come under
pressure both from relatives in this country (and
possibly their Members of Parliament) and from Chinese
to pay a price for the release of the British subjects.
We should certainly resist auch pressures firmly.
need to avoid setting a precedent for bargaining has
been very much in our minds when we have resisted
Chinese pressures over Mr. Grey. While therefore we
must not minimise the seriousness of the problem which
may face both the Governor and ourselves, I think we can
reassure him about our intentions,
The
Ne now move on from the Governor's anxieties to his
specific recommendations. He anticipates a difficult situ-
The
ation should the Chinese commit themselves to a demand for the
premature release of further confrontation prisoners.
Governor would like to make it clear to them that we are
calling a halt. He suggest the following tactics.
(a) He puts forward only to dismiss it the suggestion that
it might be worth making a formal statement of firmness
to the Chinese in London or Peking.
(b) He recommends that we moderate our references to
"improving Sino-British relations".
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