TNAG-0114-FCO40-150-Detainees-and-prisoners-following-19671968-disturbances-1969 — Page 38

SECRET

FCO telno 2 Saving to Hong Kong

-3-

But the disadvantages could be considerable: the stated basis for the release of Grey (which at present has a look of stability) might well be called in question by a message which the Chinese might choose to

believe heralded a change of line on our side; also the chances (slim though they are) of any spontaneous release of other British subjects after the release of Grey would almost certainly be destroyed.

On balance therefore we favour silence for the time being.

7. Meanwhile it goes without saying that we must continue to avoid

anything which could give substance to the idea that there are differences of view on "concessions" between the Government of Hong

Kong and Her Majesty's Government. To make a statement to the

Chinese, whether formal or informal, to the effect that no such

differences exist could, we believe, only confirm them in the

suspicion. Short of this however we shall redouble our efforts

to counter any misapprehension among the public or Press here that there are any differences whatsoever between us over the handling of the Grey case or other aspects of relations with the Chinese

Government.

FILES

Far Eastern Dept

Hong Kong Dept

Sir S.

Tomlinson

Sir E. Peck

SECRET

bbbbb