TNAG-0114-FCO40-150-Detainees-and-prisoners-following-19671968-disturbances-1969 — Page 37

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3. Indeed there appears to be close agreement among us on the

handling of the cases of the long term prisoners. We agree that, on the assumption clearly still a valid one that the expulsion of prisoners to China remains unacceptable to the Chinese, there is little to be done without crossing the limits of safety to which you refer. (We are sure, however, that you would agree that it does not follow that we should abandon the self-imposed restraint that we have observed in such matters as the Communist Press or education).

4. We agree that a further formal demand by the Chinese for the premature release of prisoners would much increase our difficulties (although it can be argued that such a demand is already inherent in the "Five Demands"). It is however difficult to see how best to

play our hand to head this off. We agree that a formal statement

of firmness on our side is as likely as not to drive the Chinese into

a hopelessly entrenched position. It would be a pity to prejudice in this way the prospect, however slight, of an improvement in the

situation of British subjects after the release of Grey.

5. Both you and the Mission in Peking recommend that we moderate our references to "improving Sino-British relations". In our eyes

the phrase has had little more than ritual meaning and it is difficult

on the face of it to believe that simple repetition of the phrase,

in the face of much hard evidence to the contrary, can have led the

Chinese to take it as an indication of readiness on our side to

capitulate on specific issues. However, we are certainly ready to

accept your advice and shall in future play these references down.

In addition we shall be careful in briefing the Press and other

contacts on the progress of Sino-British relations to avoid giving the impression that Sino-British relations are improving faster than is

in fact the case.

6. We accept that conversations of a less formal kind with the

Chinese could provide a convenient occasion for putting across the appropriate message about our intentions. We do not dispute the aptness of the points in your paragraph 7. We are concerned only to

choose our moment well. The need to head the Chinese off a collision

course over prisoners, and the desirability of influencing any broad decisions by the Chinese on relations after Grey's release argue in

favour of our taking an early opportunity to speak as you suggest.

/But

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